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DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE,* JAMES L. MERRILL,** and
GARY L. WATTS***

Economics and the Determination
of Indian Reserved Water Rights
This article discusses the role of economics in the determination of
Indian reserved water rights. In addition to discussing why economics is
important to Indian reserved water rights, we examine some parameters
of an appropriate economic analysis from a perspective which differs with
other recent papers on the subject. We conclude by addressing some
specific economic issues in the reserved rights inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
While Indian reserved or Winters doctrine' water rights have always
been the subject of heated debate, 2 they are increasingly a focus of litigation as many western states seek to inventory and quantify all water
rights, including those reserved for Indian use. The most common method
for doing so is a general stream adjudication, a judicial proceeding in
which all users of and claimants to water from a particular source (usually
a river system) must appear and prove their claims or lose their rights.'
General stream adjudications involving Indian reserved water rights are
pending in state courts in virtually every western state.'
The federal government and many tribes have also started lawsuits in
an attempt to preempt the states' efforts and obtain quantification of Indian
water rights by a federal, rather than state, court. As a result, the United
States, many western states and Indian tribes, and countless private water
*Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.
**Attorney, Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, Denver, Colorado.
***Western Research Corporation, Laramie, Wyoming.
1. So named for Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the first case to recognize such
rights.
2. This Journalrecently devoted an entire issue to their discussion. See generally, 20 NAT. RES.
J. 1 (1980).
3. Most western states have statutes enabling an interested water user or the state to begin a
general stream adjudictaion. See e.g., WYO. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977).
4. For a reasonably current inventory, see J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS
TO THE WEST, 29-104 (WATER IN THE WEST Vol. I) (1982).
5. While the United States and Tribes generally perceive the federal courts to be a more favorable
forum in which to determine Indian water rights, the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated
that the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, vested state courts with jurisdiction to determine
Indian reserved water rights as long as that determination is part of a comprehensive general stream
adjudication. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe (No. 81-2147) and Montana v. Northern Cheyenne
Tribe (No. 81-2188), 51 U.S.L.W. 5095 (July 1, 1983).
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users are concerned with Indian water rights and how they are quantified.
A brief review of what is known thus far about Indian water rights will
illustrate their importance.
Winters reserved water rights differ from prior appropriation rights (the
law of the western states) in several important respects. First, reserved
rights do not rely on diversion and application of water to beneficial use
for their existence. Rather, reserved rights may be implied from the
creation of a reservation of land for a specific purpose. 6 The priority date
of a reserved right is generally governed by an underlying reservation of
land. 7 Thus, unlike appropriative rights which are created by the actual
use of water, reserved rights may be created by legal acts which say
nothing about water.8
This characteristic is important because many Indian reservations were
created during and after the Civil War era when the United States also
sought to secure the occupation of the west by settlers. As a result, many
Indian reservations (and arguably their reserved water rights) predate the
appropriative water rights of miners, farmers and towns.'
The second important characteristic of Indian reserved water rights is
their potential magnitude. Since, as a general matter, these rights go to
the head of the line in priority, other water users often worry about the
amount of water the Indians may claim out of fear that the water available
to satisfy their own rights will be diminished.
A third aspect of Indian reserved water rights is that they are not lost
by nonuse. Under prior appropriation, water rights which have been
unexercised for a prescribed time are subject to loss through abandonment
or forfeiture proceedings and the water becomes available to other users
and uses." ° This "bankruptcy" analogue of prior appropriation insures
that water is applied to beneficial uses by weeding out those which are
economically nonproductive. Indian reserved water rights appear to coexist with the reservation of land which the water right is intended to
serve, regardless of actual use. This characteristic highlights the need for
equitable quantification of Indian reserved water rights initially, since any
over or under allocation is much less likely to be revised at a later date
than would be the case with appropriative rights."1
6. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-02 (1978).
7. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
8. Which explains why the Winters doctrine is often called the "implied reservation of water"
doctrine. See e.g., Comment, New Mexico's National Forestsand the Implied Reservation Doctrine,
16 NAT. RES. J. 975 (1976).
9. The priority date of a water right is as important as its quantity because water is distributed
to each right in order of seniority. In times of shortage, a senior right will receive its full entitlement
before the next right gets any water at all.
10. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §§51-5-51.8 at 294-99 (1967).
I1. Although, if the reserved water right were to prove insufficient for the Indians' needs, the
United States could either appropriate or purchase additional water.
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The process of quantifying Indian reserved water rights is complex.
In a recent opinion concerning National Forest reserved water rights, the
United States Supreme Court held that reserved water rights generally
exist only to fulfill the primary purposes of a reservation and that needs
for all other uses will be satisfied with water rights obtained under state
law. 2 This analysis has been applied to the determination of reserved
water rights for the Colville Indian Reservation in Washington.' 3
Applying the "primary purposes" analysis to most western Indian reservations, one would likely conclude that farming is the primary purpose
of the reservation. Although Indian reserved rights have been decreed for
fishing in the Pacific Northwest, 4 irrigated agriculture has been a central
theme in most Indian reserved water rights cases.
On the most recent occasion the United States Supreme Court has
directly addressed the quantification of Indian reserved water rights, it
has expressly approved an agricultural measure based on the well-recognized phrase: practicably irrigable acres, or "PIA". In Arizona v. California, 5 the Supreme Court awarded the amount of water required to
serve the practicably irrigable lands on five Indian reservations on the
lower Colorado River as the reserved water rights for those reservations.
Because of the precedent set by Arizona v. California and because PIA
gives rise to claims to vast quantities of water, PIA has become the
centerpiece of tribal and federal claims to water for most Indian reservations in the West. As a result, the concept of practicably irrigable
acreage is likely to be the focus of controversy and litigation throughout
the West in the coming years.
Part II of this article examines PIA, focusing on the role of economics
in quantifying Indian reserved water rights. It also presents a different
viewpoint on certain of these issues that were raised by Burness et al. in
a recent article.' 6 Part III addresses a broader problem: whether PIA is
an equitable means of allocating a scarce resource and quantifying reserved water rights for the needs of Indian people.
ECONOMICS AND PIA
General Considerations
While "practicably irrigable acres" is a compact and convenient phrase,
it provides no criteria for determining whether particular land is indeed
12. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 6, at 702.
13. Colville Confederated Tribe v. Walton, 647 F2d 42, 47 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
14. See e.g., United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979); Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, supra note 13.
15. 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963), decree, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended, 383 U.S. 268
(1966), supplemental decree, 439 U.S. 419 (1979)(per curiam).
16. Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, Practicably IrrigableAcreage and Economic
Feasibility: The Role of Time, Ethics and Discounting, 23 NAT. RES. J. 289 (1983).
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practicably irrigable. Some elaboration is needed to render the concept
useful.
In recent proceedings before a new Special Master in Arizona v. California, the United States and State parties agreed "that the land must be
arable and the project within engineering feasibility" and that "economic
feasibility is the appropriate general inquiry"' 7 in determining whether
land is practicably irrigable. Although the Tribes disagreed about the
relevance of economics, Special Master Tuttle concluded that "'practicably irrigable' as used by the parties and Court in the prior proceedings
[those conducted before Special Master Simon Rifkind which resulted in
the Court's 1963 opinion], very nearly means 'economically feasible""'8
and applied the same standard to the proceedings before him.' 9
In another recent trial of Indian water rights as part of Wyoming's Big
Horn Adjudication, the major parties agreed that "those lands capable of
sustained irrigation at reasonable cost" are practicably irrigable.2 0 While
there are many possible definitions of "PIA," these are helpful because
they begin to articulate the concept with words which suggest some
relevant inquiries.
"Lands capable of . . . irrigation" suggests that lands must be arable
and that it must be possible to deliver water, thereby making the land
"irrigable" as opposed to merely "arable." This phrase also suggests that
there must be a dependable source of irrigation water upon which prudent
planners would rely, The words "reasonable cost" imply some inclusion
of economics in the inquiry and "sustained" suggests that the relevant
time horizon of the analysis is long, an idea in harmony with the perpetual
nature of a reserved water right.
While the definition and elements of PIA could fuel endless debate,
several facts are self-evident within the context of reserved water rights
litigation. The disciplines invoked and methodologies employed within
each discipline must be selected with reference to the product (a quantity
of water) and the context of the inquiry (quantification of a reserved water
right which cannot be lost through nonuse and which likely will bear an
17. Arizona v. California (No. 8 Orig.), Report of Special Master Elbert P. Tuttle (hereinafter
Tuttle Report) at 94 (February 22, 1982). While the Supreme Court rejected the Master's recommendation that PIA be relitigated for all five reservations, the Court did accept the Master's PIA
analysis as applied to lands which had been added to the Fort Mojave Reservation since the prior
proceedings. Arizona v. California, 456 U.S. 912 (1983). As a result, Master Tuttle's general
discussion of the prior proceedings and his analysis of PIA in the current proceedings carries some
precedential weight.
18. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 94.
19. Id. at 95.
20. See In Re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming (Fifth Jud. Dist., C.A. No. 4993) (Dec. 15, 1982)
(hereinafter Big Horn Adjudication), Transcript of proceedings before Special Master Teno Roncalio
at 13, 160-64.
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early priority date). Because of the unique, nonforfeiture characteristic
of reserved rights discussed above, we suggest that exacting standards
and analysis are in order.
Many federal and state agencies have developed standards and criteria
which may assist the PIA inquiry. Examples include the Bureau of Reclamation's guidelines for determining arability 2 and the Water Resource
Council's guidelines for determining the economic feasibility of water
resource projects.22 While the appropriateness of these standards for the
special inquiry of PIA is subject to a variety of considerations beyond
the scope of this paper, these do at least offer a place to begin. Regardless
of the precise standards involved in each discipline, it is clear from recent
cases that the determination of PIA requires an examination of several
factors. The following section addresses these.
Specific Elements of PIA
While PIA may involve a variety of additional studies, we believe that,
at a minimum, determinations of arability, engineering feasibility, water
supply, and economic feasibility are prerequisite to a finding that lands
are practicably irrigable3

Arability
Although the practicability of irrigation is determined by the interaction
of many complex factors, the arability of land is a cornerstone of the
analysis. If land is not arable, it is not irrigable, and thus cannot be
practicably irrigable. Sound economic and engineering analysis must rely
upon an arable land base and other information provided by soil scientists.
As a result, it is imperative that the information the soil scientist provides
economists and engineers regarding soils, topography, and drainage be
accurate and reliable to enable these investigators to determine matters
such as sprinkler and drain design, cost estimates, and yield projections
with confidence.
Engineering
An engineering analysis is a necessary component in determining practicably irrigable acres. In classifying land as practicably irrigable there
21. See e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, Water and Power Resources Service Release No. 1152, Series 110, Part 115, LAND RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS (May 15, 1980).
22. See e.g., U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR
WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES PLANNING-LEVEL C; FINAL RULE, 45 Fed.
Reg. 64366 (Sept. 29, 1980).
23. This list does not include factors such as present and historical ownership and status of land
which would entitle it to a reserved water right or other consideratons which might preclude, for
reasons peculiar to the individual fact situation involved, the grant of a reserved water right.
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must be a showing that using current technology, 4 engineers can design
systems capable of delivering irrigation water to the lands and capable
of draining excess irrigation water from them. In addition, engineering
analysis is necessary to determine the water requirements for irrigation
and thus provide benchmark data for an investigation into the adequacy
of water supplies. A complete engineering analysis generally examines
the location of an appropriate and adequate water source; it also designs
capable on-farm, conveyance and drainage systems or establishes the
existence thereof, determines water requirements, and estimates construction, operation and maintenance costs. Information developed through
the engineering analysis must be supplied to economists and hydrologists
as appropriate.
Water Supply
For land to be classified as practicably irrigable, there must be a reliable
source of irrigation water upon which prudent farmers, investors, engineers, and economists would rely when the water supply is administered
in accordance with applicable law.25 If the land is water short, or if the
owner must spend money to achieve a full water supply, economics may
make it impractical to farm the land. In light of the fundamental importance of economics and water supply to the determination of practicably
irrigable lands, it would be erroneous to classify significantly water short
areas as practicably irrigable. z6
Economics
To successfully sustain long-term irrigation (planning horizons of 100
years are common), the land must provide returns which render the farming economically productive. As a result, we believe that it must be
shown that the water delivery systems and farm units can be designed,
built, operated, and maintained at economic costs which do not exceed
the returns which will be realized from the land.
Economics is clearly the key in determining PIA because current precedent suggests that economically feasible lands may be practicably irrig24. Special Master Tuttle used current technology in developing his recommendations concerning
PIA, as did the parties in the Big Horn Adjudication. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 97-98. In its
recent Arizona v. California opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that changes in technology which
increased the amount of PIA would not, standing alone, be good reason to recalculate the reserved
water rights of an Indian Reservation. 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1394 (1983).
25. The water supply issue can be complex because the availability of water in priority depends,
in part, on yet unresolved legal issues concerning the integrated administration of appropriative and
Indian reserved water rights. In addition, the exercise of a reserved water right in some cases may
be constrained by equitable doctrines such as estoppel.
26. Water-short lands might be practicably irrigable if water storage were part of a project design
but the cost of storage would have to be included in the economic analysis.
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able but econommically infeasible lands are not. As Special Master Tuttle
stated in Arizona v. California, "for present purposes, a finding that annual
benefits exceed costs will suffice for a finding of practicable irrigability." 27
Likewise, the major parties and Master in the Big Horn Adjudication
agreed that benefits must exceed costs for lands to be practicably irrigable. 2" In fact, the necessity that benefits exceed costs is as old as the
PIA standard itself. In referring to the prior proceedings in Arizona v.
California, Special Master Tuttle observed that "[t]he feasibility tests
may not have been done in detail, but the testimony definitely indicates
that a benefit-cost analysis was the standard then used as it 29was for the
other federal projects studied by the United States experts."
Within benefit-cost analysis, however, many issues arise concerning
the selection and application of economic assumptions. Three of the more
controversial areas are the treatment of secondary benefits and costs, the
selection of a discount rate, and the use of opportunity costs. We address
these topics in the next section.
Economic Considerations
Secondary Benefits and Costs
Some commentators have argued that, in the evaluation of economic
feasibility of irrigation projects proposed as a basis for PIA, the analysis
should assess all secondary benefits "to whomsoever they may accrue." 3 0
While these commentators acknowledge that recent and current guidelines
do not provide for an assessment of secondary elements, 3 they argue that
using contemporary economic standards to quantify PIA penalizes Indians
in relation to more lenient economic standards non-Indians have used as
the basis for funding irrigation projects in the past. There are several
problems with this argument.
First, the nature of water rights at stake in federally funded reclamation
projects are prior appropriation rights;32 Indian reserved rights are virtually
their antithesis, as discussed above. As a result, the justification for
automatically incorporating past reclamation guidelines into the quantification of Indian reserved rights is far from clear. In fact, it is incongruous
to relax the feasibility standards used in the quantification of reserved
27. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 100.
28. Big Horn Adjudication, Report of Special Master Teno Roncalio (hereinafter "Roncalio
Report") at 183 (Dec. 15, 1982).
29. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 94 n. 13 (citations omitted).
30. Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Landsford, United States Reclamation Policy and Indian
Water Rights, 20 NAT. RES. J.807, 824 (1980).
31. Id. See, 38 Fed. Reg. 24777 (Sept. 10, 1973); 45 Fed. Reg. 64366 (Sept. 29, 1980).
32. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (unless explicit Congressional mandate to
the contrary, federal reclamation projects operate within the confines of state water law).
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rights from the guidelines applied to appropriative water rights which are
subject to the ongoing economic test of beneficial use.
Second, given advances in irrigation technology, it is far from clear
that Indian water rights would have been quantified at a more generous
amount in the past. Recent developments in pump and sprinkler design
have made irrigable today lands which would not have been considered
irrigable three decades ago;33 in the past, these lands would not have been
eligible for consideration as PIA under any economic standards. The net
changes in PIA as a result of technological advances and different economic standards would be difficult to determine, but there is no evidence
that PIA determined at any time in the past would have been greater than
it is today.
Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to evaluate PIA using current
technological standards but past economic guidelines. This "time machine" approach would relegate the PIA analysis to a search for the most
favorable conditions in each discipline. As Special Master Tuttle stated:
My reading of the transcript reveals that the evidence of "practicable
irrigability" [in the prior Arizona v. California proceedings] was
determined by then current standards. I am similarly convinced that
my determinations of practicable irrigability should be based on
present standards. Reference to past standards would introduce an
additional complication in an already complex case. Given that these
issues are to be litigated presently, the most sensible method of
determining feasibility is by using present standards.34
Finally, federal water project standards were developed to inform public
spending questions concerning whether to build a project or which project
to select. Reclamation projects usually made "new" water available (which
had previously not been available for use when and where needed) through
storage, thereby increasing the overall output of agricultural goods. Quantification of Indian reserved water rights involves an allocation to a senior
but dormant right which may well displace existing uses. To the extent
it does so, it represents a transfer of the right to use the resource (a "zero
sum game"), rather than a net addition to the resources available to society
as a whole.
Indeed, if PIA economics is to consider secondary benefits, then it
must account for secondary costs as well, including the losses from
discontinuing uses of water which are curtailed by the exercise of the
33. For example, lands of up to 20% slope are now considered irrigable by modem sprinkler
systems; for the most part, gravity irrigation is feasible only on slopes up to roughly 5%. As a result,
lands with 5% to 20% slope are now considered irrigable but in the past would not have been.
34. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 98 (footnotes omitted). While these comments were made
in the context of irrigation technology, we believe they are equally applicable to all other components
of the PIA analysis.
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reserved right. Failure to do so is not unlike estimating the balance in
one's bank account by adding up the deposits and ignoring the withdrawals. The United States Supreme Court also stated that adverse impacts
on other water users should be considered in quantifying reserved water
rights:
When, as in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated,
federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-forgallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy
state and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention of Congress and must be weighed in determining what, if
any, water Congress reserves for use in the national forests.35
On this point, the Court was unanimous. The first sentence of the dissent
begins:
I agree with the Court that the implied-reservation doctrine should
be applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained
water rights under state law .... 36
While this language arose in quantifying reserved water rights for national
forests, the same analysis has been applied to the quantification of Indian
water rights. 37 And in recently refusing to allow the relitigation of PIA
in Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court was careful to observe the
potentially adverse consequences of relitigation upon appropriators in the
Lower Colorado River Basin.38
It may be that, given current standards, an analysis of only the primary
benefits and costs of irrigation is sufficient for the PIA inquiry. If secondary elements are to be considered, however, the economist must account for secondary costs as well as secondary benefits.
Discounting Methods
There is probably no more controversial subject in the economics of
reserved water rights than the selection of an appropriate discount rate.
The subject is controversial because, first, the problem does not have a
strictly objective solution; instead, the choice of a discount rate must be
based upon professional judgment involving a careful analysis of the
overall circumstances and the specific problem under analysis. Second,
the chosen rate plays a major role in determining the outcome of economic
feasibility analyses in general and benefit-cost analyses in particular. Low
discount rates will tend to show benefits exceeding costs (thus establishing
35.
36.
37.
38.

United States v. New
Id. at 718 (Powell, J.
Colville Confederated
Arizona v. California,

Mexico, supra note 6, at 705.
dissenting).
Tribe, supra note 13.
103 S. Ct. 1382, 1392 (1983).
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the existence of PIA), while relatively high discount rates, other things
being equal, will show costs in excess of benefits (the land is not PIA).
Some economists advocate the use of ethical considerations that tend
to justify a relatively low discount rate. 39 The literature they cite concerning ethics," however, focuses on questions of nuclear waste and CO 2
buildup in the atmosphere resulting from fossil fuels development. The
assumptions implicit in these types of analyses include:
1. Benefits (more energy) would accrue to the current generation
while costs (pollution) would be borne by future generations; and
2. A long time horizon (e.g. 1 million years) makes it impractical
to assume that the current generation can compensate future generations for any costs imposed upon them.
Under these circumstances, justifying a low discount rate is possible. If
a low discount rate were not used, the costs imposed upon future generations would be insignificant compared to present benefits viewed from
the perspective of the current generation.
The problem of determining PIA is, however, quite different than problems involving CO 2 buildup and nuclear waste. Quantifying PIA does not
involve a large disparity of costs and benefits among generations. The
problem is intergenerational only in the sense that many generations are
involved. Each generation individually will be faced with both costs and
benefits attributable to irrigated agricultural endeavors, however, and for
this reason, the compensation issue does not even arise. The relevant
question is whether the costs exceed the benefits, or vice versa, for any
given generation.
Even if the intergenerational problem were an issue in PIA, these
economists" seem to overlook the above points by focusing on the following statement:
39. Burness, supra note 16.
40. The literature cited by Burness draws upon the following works:
Schulze, Brookshire, Sandier, The Social Rate of Discountfor Nuclear Waste Storage: Economics
or Ethics?, 21 NAT. RES. J. 811 (1981) (hereinafter Ethics-i); d'Arge, Schulze, Brookshire, BenefitCost Valuation of Long-Term Future Effects: The Case of C0 2, Workshop on the Methodology for
Impact Analysis of Climate Change, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (April 1980) and Department of Economics, University of Wyoming (hereinafter Ethics-2); Schulze and Brookshire, Intergenerational
Ethics and Depletion of Fossil Fuels, J. QUIRK, et al. (Eds.) COAL MODELS AND THEIR USE
INGOVERNMENT PLANNING (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982, Chap. 10) (hereinafter, Ethics3); S. Ben-David, A. Kneese, and W. Schulze, A Study of the Ethical Foundations of Benefit-Cost
Analysis Techniques, Working paper, Program in Resource Economics, University of New Mexico
(August 1979) (hereinafter Ethics-4); A. Kneese, S. Ben-David, D. Brookshire, W. Schulze, and
D. Bolt, Long-Term Nuclear Waste Storage:An Economic and Ethical Perspective, Working paper,
Department of Economics, University of Wyoming (no date), forthcoming in ETHICS AND VALUES: THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE (R. Kates ed.) (hereinafter, Ethics-5).
41. Burness, supra note 16.
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.. . Discount rates are then determined solely by the ethical criteria

employed in the analysis.42

The literature referenced, including the paper from which the above quote
was taken, clearly indicates that the discount rate should be equated to
the market rate of return if compensation is possible:
In the Utilitarian Ethic, if investment is possible then the appropriate
discount rate is the market rate of return . . . where an egalitarian
solution is achieved, the discount rate exceeds or equals the market
rate of return if compensation (investment) is possible...
The Nietzschaen criterion depends on whether the present or future
can be best off. In case (a) the present can be best off. Thus a discount
rate of + infinity is placed on the future in all cases. In case (b),
the future is best off. If investment by the present is possible, then
the market rate of return is the appropriate discount rate for decision

making...
.. . in the Paretian ethic, if investment is possible . . . implies the
market rate of return is again appropriate as the discount rate.4"

There is no evidence to suggest that compensation between generations
is impossible with respect to Indian reserved rights; further we argue that
it is irrelevant to the issue here.' With regard to market rates of return,
there is no way of making a totally objective assessment. As one witness
testified in the Big Horn Adjudication:
There is no objective way of picking a discount rate. You can get
some people that will tell you it's very high, and some people that
will tell you it's very low.4"

Given that there is no objective way to pick an appropriate discount
rate, it seems inappropriate to quantify a reserved right based upon a
single arbitrary discount rate. To do so, in effect, would make the quantification of PIA on Indian reservations a subjective matter. Instead, we
42. Id. Accord Ethics-3, supra note 40, at 176.
43. Ethics-3, supra note 40, at 174-76 (Emphasis added).
44. Even if compensation is not possible, the Bumess interpretation, supra note 16, is far less
conclusive than they make it out to be. For instance, if compensation is not possible then under the
Utilitarian, Egalitarian and Paretian ethical systems the discount rate is bounded by -1 and infinityhardly a "low" discount rate. In a sub-case for the Nietzschaen and Egalitarian ethical system the
discount rate equals infinity-hardly a low rate. Only in the alternative sub-case for the Nietzschaen
and Egalitarian ethics is the discount rate equal to (-l)--truly a low rate. Thus, only in 2 out of 8
cases under four ethical regimes is the discount rate low. Ethics-3, supra note 40, at 175 (Table 101).
45. Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 20, transcript at 8875. Even the same individual will
utilize in various work alternative discount rates. See Cummings, Burt and McFarland, Defining
Upper Limits to Groundwater Development in the Arid West, 59 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON., 94347 (1977).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

suggest the use of a range of discount rates for evaluating the economic
feasibility of irrigation on Indian reservations. The relevant task is then
to pick a reasonable range of discount rates, and decide whether PIA
exists if economic feasibility results vary within that range of rates.
We think a reasonable range of discount rates can be determined using
the following criteria:
1. that range should include the discount rate or rates which are
commonly used in evaluating federally funded non-Indian water
projects, a contention that is certainly justifiable in terms of equity
between Indians and non-Indians. This rate is approximately
77/8 percent today;46
2. a zero discount rate is too low because it reduces economic feasibility analysis to a trivial, nondiscriminatory case where no
distinction is made between current versus future consumption;
and
3. the range should bracket real (adjusted for the effects of inflation)
rates of return experienced in the private sector of the economy.
The vast majority of real rates of return to capital in various sectors
of the American economy are between 4 and 11 percent. 47 For this reason
and because it satisfies criteria (1) and (2) above, we suggest 4 to 11
percent as a reasonable range of real discount rates for evaluating the
economic feasibility of irrigated agricultural projects used in establishing
reserved rights on Indian reservations.
We choose an "unweighted" range-much as Burness, et al. did in
the "consumption displaced" determination of a discount rate to reflect
the inherent inability to determine whether the actual "investment displaced" would or would not be tied to an index of capital stock.48 Other
sources, however, of weighted average rates of return can be found in
Lind, et al.," which includes a paper by Stockfisch ° which presents
results that for 1961-1971 the corporate and non-corporate weighted
average of return ranged from 8.4% to 14.2%.
46. 48 Fed. Reg. 3665 (Jan. 26, 1983).
47. Fraumeni and Jorgenson, Rates of Return by IndustrialSector in the U.S., 1948-76, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 326-30 (May 1980).
48. Another issue which constantly arises is the "marginal versus average rates of return as the
appropriate measure." Often the assertion is made "that average returns are higher than marginal."
Burness, supra note 16 at 300. This assumption overlooks the fact that in competitive general
equilibrium, average and marginal returns are equal. In addition, new technology and new markets
demonstrate that the world is not a forever downward treadmill of diminishing marginal productivity
where eventually we will reach a point that the "last" investments' marginal productivity in terms
of capital will be indistinguishable from zero.
49. R. Lind, K. Arrow, G. Corey, P. Dasgupta, A. Sen, T. Stauffer, J. Stiglitz, J. Stockfisch and
R. Wilson, Discountingfor Time and Risk in Energy Policy (Resources for the Future, Inc. Washington, D.C., distributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
50. Id. at 269 (Table 7-4, Measuring the Social Rate of Return on Private Investment).
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Rather than belabor the argument further, we simply note that available
empirical evidence does not uniformly point to a low discount rate but,
depending on the assumptions and data, a wide range will be derived and
should be used in a PIA quantification. This technique avoids the extreme
result of penalizing either Indians or non-Indians by the use of an arbitrarily low or high discount rate.
Thus, within a range of 4-11 percent for the real rate of return to
capital, it is still likely that benefits might exceed costs at certain discount
rates, yet the reverse might be true at higher discount rates. We suggest
there should be no absolute rule for using a discount rate to determine
what PIA is and is not under such circumstances. Instead, we suggest
leaving this ambiguity as latitude in which courts may exercise their
discretion and evaluate the ethics and equities of the problem, particularly
in view of the shortcomings in the PIA concept discussed in Part III
below.
Opportunity Costs
Benefit-cost analysis, like most other contemporary economic methods,
assumes that inputs such as the material and labor used in a project
should be valued at their "true" cost rather than their market price, if
the two differ. Economists usually equate the true cost of a resource with
its opportunity cost; that is, the cost of what society gives up in putting
the resource to a different use. For example, if a laborer employed in
digging an irrigation canal could alternatively be used to build a highway,
then the opportunity cost of that labor would be what society gives up
in highways to build irrigation canals instead.
Taking this notion one step further, it is apparent that if the labor used
to build an irrigation canal could be employed in no other way, its opportunity cost is zero. This concept is often used to justify assigning little
or no cost to labor used to construct a project in an area of high unemployment. Since Indian reservations are traditionally areas of high unemployment, it is not surprising that some economists advocate the use
of zero opportunity costs for labor in benefit-cost analyses to quantify
PIA on Indian reservations.
For example, two witnesses in Wyoming's Big Horn Adjudication
argued that virtually all of the labor employed in building, operating and
managing a large-scale irrigation project should be assigned an opportunity cost of zero over a project life of 100 years. 5' This position is
contrary to contemporary economic practices which suggest that using a
zero opportunity cost for labor in the short run may be appropriate. We
51. Big Horn Adjudication, supra note 20, at 4986-89 and 8856-60.
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believe it unreasonable in the long run, however, to assume that labor
that is able and competent to be employed in one project (say an irrigation
project) would not ever have the opportunity or training to work on
anything else over a period of 100 years. Furthermore, once labor is
trained, its opportunity cost cannot be zero.
Using a zero cost of labor over a 100 year period biases economic
analyses toward economic feasibility, resulting in larger quantified reserved water rights on Indian reservations. Proponents view it as another
way to correct some of the "shortcomings" or inequities in the PIA
concept. They further argue that there are simply no "opportunities" for
Indian employment other than irrigated agriculture.
In effect, using a zero opportunity cost for labor over a time frame of
100 years or more is equivalent to assuming that no efforts will be made
by individual, tribal, state or federal groups to improve employment
opportunities on Indian reservations during the next 100 years, in the
absence of an irrigation project. It also assumes Indians place no value
upon their leisure time and that the time spent by otherwise "unemployed"
Indians on cultural or other work related to Indian heritage is of no value
to their Tribes. Furthermore, it assumes that generations of Indians yet
unborn will be unable to find employment in pursuits not related to
irrigated agriculture, but will readily accept employment in irrigated agriculture if opportunities exist.
No one doubts that unemployment on Indian reservations is a complex
and pervasive problem. What facts are known concerning this situation,
however, appear to be contrary to the assumptions outlined above. For
example, evidence introduced in the Big Horn Adjudication shows that
employment on irrigated agriculture projects is not valued as highly in
terms of tribal, cultural and lifestyle preferences as is employment in
ranching and other pursuits2
In view of this evidence, it appears that increased employment opportunities in irrigated agriculture may not be the solution to Indian
unemployment and that the rationale for opportunity costing labor associated with such projects at zero over the long term is unsound.
As this discussion illustrates, virtually every facet of an economic
analysis to determine PIA can become a conceptual battleground. Given
the stakes in most Indian water rights litigation, however, we doubt that
anyone could devise a quantification standard which all sides would accept. While it may be the best available standard thus far, the concept of
PIA does have some shortcomings which we briefly discuss below.
52. Id. at 13214-25.
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PROBLEMS WITH PIA
The problem of arriving at a fair and equitable quantification of Indian
reserved rights on reservations in the West is a complex one. This issue,
however, presents two separate questions:
1. Is the practicably irrigable acreage concept an equitable means
of quantifying reserved Indian water rights?
2. If so, what methodologies should be used to determine PIA on a
given reservation?
Section II of this paper discussed some aspects of methodologies for
determining PIA. It is apparent, however, that regardless of the methodologies used, there are serious problems with using PIA as a universal
tool for quantifying water rights on all Indian reservations.
One problem is that PIA is based on engineering, soils, and economic
considerations concerning specific land masses, irrespective of human
needs on a reservation. It is possible that relatively few Indians residing
on a large fertile reservation could receive an enormous reserved water
right, far beyond the amount necessary to maintain a decent standard of
living. On the other hand, PIA might suggest a minimal reserved water
right to a large population of Indians on a reservation where land is less
susceptible to irrigation. These examples would appear to contradict the
philosophy underlying the Winters53 decision that the principal rationale
for reserved water rights is to "improve" the Indians through their personal participation in farming.
Another problem with PIA is that, in the arid West, it could lead to
the conclusion that all water in a river was reserved for Indian use. Such
a conclusion would contradict other Congressional intent evidenced by
federal laws which encouraged non-Indian irrigation in the West. The
Supreme Court seems to have recognized this conflict by suggesting that
reserved water rights must be quantified with sensitivity to other users."
A third problem with PIA is that the amount of practicably irrigable
acreage changes through time as technology and economic conditions
evolve. For example, modern sprinkler and pumping technology can
supply water to land that would not have been irrigable 30 years ago.
However, the Supreme Court's suggestion that changed technology, alone,
is insufficient basis for the recalculation of PIA, means that the quantity
of an Indian reserved water right may depend, in part, on the arbitrary
selection of the time at which the quantification occurs."
53. Winters, supra note 1.
54. Supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
55. Tuttle Report, supra note 17.
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Finally, much of the legal basis for the PIA concept derives from an
assumption that Congressional intent expressed in treaties establishing
Indian reservations was primarily to "civilize" the tribes by teaching
them to farm. We doubt that Congressional intent one hundred years ago
is necessarily related to the needs or aspirations of modem day Indians.
Burness et al. point out one of these potential problems in their recent
article; i.e., that a determination of PIA ". . . precludes any future assessment of the project." 56 They then argue for lenient standards (i.e.,
low discount rates) by introducing intergenerational and ethical arguments
in an economics context. The specific problems with these arguments
have been discussed in Part II above. In a broad sense, however, we feel
they have focused on the wrong issue. If PIA reserved rights really are
irreversible, the Courts should be just as concerned with an over-allocation
of water as with an under-allocation.
This problem seems to have been recognized by the courts in their
more recent decisions. For example, the Supreme Court has modified the
scope of the reserved right by suggesting other criteria such as "minimal
needs," 57 "primary purposes," 5 8 "entirely defeated" 5 9 and "moderate
living. "60 In its most recent decision, the Court partially justified its refusal
to reopen the Arizona vs. California PIA adjudication by pointing out
that if it did, it might also reconsider whether PIA is an appropriate tool
for quantifying Indian reserved water rights.6
Special Master Tuttle stated:
...the "practicably irrigable" standard is not necessarily a standard
to be used in all cases and when it is used it may not have the exact
meaning it holds in this case. The amount reserved in each case is
the amount required to make each reservation livable. 62
CONCLUSION
The very nature and purpose of Indian reserved water rights makes
their quantification a controversial issue. Despite its shortcomings, the
concept of practicably irrigable acreage probably will continue as a yardstick for Indian reserved water rights in western water planning. To the
extent that it does, we recommend that strict and appropriate criteria be
used to quantify PIA. While ethics is undoubtedly important in the quan56. Burness, supra note 16.
57. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
58. United States v. New Mexico, supra note 6, at 702.
59. Id. at 700.
60. Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658, 686
(1979).
61. United States, supra note 6.
62. Tuttle Report, supra note 17, at 98-99.
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tification of Indian reserved water rights, ethical considerations should
be applied as a whole by the Court, not individually by each discipline
within the PIA inquiry.
Because of the inherent problems with the concept of PIA, however,
we do not believe it should be applied blindly in all cases involving the
quantification of Indian reserved water rights. Recent court decisions seem
to support this interpretation. Whether PIA will ultimately serve to determine the reserved water rights of most western Indian reservations
remains to be seen.

